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NOTE
A MAJESTIC VACATION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
TAKES A BREAK FROM THE MODERN
TREND OF INCLUDING SUBCHAPTER S
ELECTIONS IN THE PROPERTY OF A
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
By: C. Chadwick Cullum
ABSTRACT
Subchapter S elections provide small businesses and their owners
with substantial tax benefits.  These elections allow the businesses to
avoid taxation at the corporate level and cause the tax liability of the
company to pass through to the shareholders.  When a Subchapter S
entity enters bankruptcy, the company expects tax liability to continue
to pass through to the shareholders, but the shareholders often want to
shift the tax liability back onto the company because they do not have
access to the company’s income while it is in bankruptcy.  Whether Sub-
chapter S elections are property of the company’s bankruptcy estate is a
significant factor in the ability of shareholders of these entities to revoke
these elections to avoid the tax liability.  Until recently, courts had
found that a Subchapter S election is property of the bankruptcy estate,
but never addressed a situation involving qualified subsidiaries of Sub-
chapter S Corporations.  In In re Majestic Star, the Third Circuit held
that these elections are not property rights and vacated the lower bank-
ruptcy court’s order to restore the tax statuses of a subsidiary in bank-
ruptcy and its parent corporation.
Comparing the broad application of property rights in bankruptcy
used in In re Dittmar, this Note demonstrates that the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals improperly limited its analysis concerning the prop-
erty nature of these elections.  Subchapter S elections should be prop-
erty of the estate because they provide an economic benefit to the
company that can satisfy claims of creditors.  The inequities and nega-
tive implications that resulted from the lower bankruptcy court’s order
are also not as significant as the Third Circuit would make them seem.
Some of these negative consequences could have been remedied by fix-
ing an error in the order.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For over fifteen years, courts have held that S Corporation elections
are property of the debtor company’s bankruptcy estate.1  This causes
shareholders to continue to be liable for the taxes from any income of
the bankrupt company—when they no longer have access to the com-
pany’s income—and prevents the shareholders from revoking these
elections.2  Many have discussed the fairness of this tax liability on
shareholders of S Corporations in bankruptcy.3  Recently in In re Ma-
1. See infra Section II.B.3–4.
2. See infra Section II.
3. See Niki Wilkinson, Furthering Congress’ Intent Through Mourad v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, but with Inequitable Results to Shareholders of a Liqui-
dated S-Corporation, 8 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 201, 218–22 (2006);
Camilla Berit Galesi, Shareholders’ Rights Regarding Termination of a Debtor Corpo-
ration’s S Status in a Bankruptcy Setting, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 157, 158–59 (2001);
Richard A. Shaw, Taxing Shareholders on the Income of an S Corporation in Bank-
ruptcy, BUS. ENTITIES, Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 46–47, available at 1999 WL 1419055.
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jestic Star Casino, LLC, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Subchapter S elections are not property of the estate, highlighting this
alleged inequity and other negative implications of the lower court’s
ruling.4 Nevertheless, Subchapter S tax elections reflect the nature of
property interests, and should be considered property of the debtor
company’s bankruptcy estate because they create an opportunity for
future economic benefit to the company, which creditors may use to
satisfy claims.
Section II of this Note sets forth the tax and bankruptcy law per-
taining to Subchapter S entities including the Internal Revenue Code,
Bankruptcy Code, and relevant case law.  The statutory requirements
of S Corporations and Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiaries (“QSubs”)
provide substantial tax benefits, but they also place restrictions on the
shareholders and parent companies.
Sections III and IV present the facts and ruling of Majestic Star and
evaluate the Third Circuit’s legal arguments related to whether Sub-
chapter S elections should be property of the estate.  The court incor-
rectly relied on a comparison between these elections and net
operating losses to conclude that the elections were not property.  A
better comparison can be found in In re Dittmar, where the Tenth Cir-
cuit properly applied a broad definition of property holding that stock
appreciation rights were property of the estate.5
Section V illustrates how the inequities and negative implications
raised by the Majestic Star court are not as negative as the court would
make them seem.  A timing and specificity error in the bankruptcy
court’s order created some of these problems, and the Third Circuit
could have fixed the error rather than vacating the order.
II. SUBCHAPTER S ENTITIES
S Corporations and QSubs are two tax status elections for business
entities created by Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code
(“IRC”).6  While the requirements of Subchapter S elections place se-
rious restrictions on shareholders, they also provide substantial tax
benefits.7  The pass-through nature of S Corporations, and the disre-
garded status of QSubs, also complicate bankruptcy proceedings be-
cause the debtor company and the company’s owners want to avoid
any potential tax liability.8
4. Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino,
LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 745–46, 752–58, 760 (3d Cir. 2013).
5. Parks v. Dittmar (In re Dittmar), 618 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2010).
6. I.R.C. § 1361(a)–(b) (2012).
7. See infra Section II.A.
8. See infra Section II.B.3–4.
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A. Taxation of S Corporations and Qualified
Subchapter S Subsidiaries
Congress added Subchapter S to the IRC so that small businesses
and their owners could enjoy a number of benefits over C Corpora-
tions.9 The main feature of Subchapter S Corporations is that “share-
holder’s pro rata share of the corporation’s” tax items including
income, losses, deductions, or credits pass through to the share-
holder.10  Income from a C Corporation is taxed both at the corporate
level and again at the individual level when dividends are distrib-
uted.11  An S Corporation avoids this double taxation of income be-
cause it is not subject to regular taxes under the IRC.12  Instead,
income is taxed only at the individual level after it passes through to
the shareholders based on their percentage of ownership of the corpo-
ration.13  Depending on the difference between the corporate tax
bracket and the shareholder’s individual tax bracket, the shareholder
may incur a lower tax liability.14  Congress also intended a “substan-
tial benefit” for small corporations to be able to offset losses that
could not otherwise be offset at the corporate level against the share-
holder’s other income at the individual level.15  Not surprisingly, most
corporations elect to file as S Corporations to take advantage of these
benefits.16
The IRC automatically classifies a corporation as a C Corpora-
tion.17 However, a small business corporation may elect under
§ 1362(a)(1) to be treated as an S Corporation.18  All the shareholders
of the small business corporation must consent to take this election.19
The IRC defines a small business corporation as a domestic corpora-
tion that does not “(A) have more than 100 shareholders, (B) have as
a shareholder a person . . . who is not an individual, (C) have a non-
resident alien as a shareholder, and (D) have more than [one] class of
stock.”20
9. Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 205 (citing S. REP. NO. 85-1983 (1958), reprinted in
1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4791, 4876).
10. I.R.C. § 1366(a) (2012).
11. Id. §§ 11(a), 61(a)(7).
12. Id. § 1363(a).
13. Id. § 1366(a).
14. Wilkinson, supra note 3, at 205 (citing S. REP. NO. 85-1983 (1958), reprinted in
1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4791, 4876).
15.  S. REP. NO. 85-1983 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4791, 4876.
16. Table 1: Selected financial data on businesses 1980-2008, IRS STATISTICS OF
INCOME DIV., http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/80ot1all.xls (last updated Dec.
18, 2013).
17. I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2) (2012).
18. Id. § 1362(a)(1).
19. Id. § 1362(a)(2).
20. Id. § 1361(b)(1).
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The election to be an S Corporation remains in effect until termi-
nated.21  The election will be revoked if: (1) shareholders owning
more than 50 percent of the corporation’s stock consent to a revoca-
tion; (2) the company no longer qualifies as a “small business corpora-
tion”; or (3) “passive investment income exceeds 25 percent of gross
receipts for three consecutive taxable years and [the] corporation has
accumulated earnings and profits.”22  Once terminated, a small busi-
ness corporation may not make an election to become an S Corpora-
tion again for five years, unless permitted by the Secretary of the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).23
These requirements and limitations for Subchapter S elections
make these entities somewhat fragile, so that the tax status must be
“carefully monitored and maintained.”24  For example, one share-
holder could sell his or her shares to one of the restricted parties,
causing the company to no longer qualify as a small business corpora-
tion.25  This would revoke the S Corporation status, and none of the
other shareholders could prevent it.26
In 1996, Congress created the Qualified Subchapter S Subsidiary, so
that an S Corporation might function as a holding company.27  A
QSub has its own corporate charter under state law but from the per-
spective of the IRS is not a separate entity from its parent S Corpora-
tion; its separate corporate status is disregarded.28  For tax purposes,
all of its assets, liabilities, income, deductions, and credits belong to
the parent S Corporation.29  To qualify as a disregarded entity, the
parent S Corporation must own 100 percent of the subsidiary and
elect to treat the subsidiary as a QSub.30  Failure to maintain these
requirements will result in termination of the QSub elections.31  The
parent corporation must also continue to meet the requirements of a
small business corporation.32  A parent S Corporation may revoke its
subsidiary’s QSub status at any time by filing a statement with the
21. Id. § 1362(c).
22. Id. § 1362(d).
23. Id. § 1362(g).
24. Jerald David August, Benefits and Burdens of Subchapter S in a Check-The-
Box World, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 287, 305 (1999).
25. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1).
26. Id. § 1362(d)(2).
27. S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 52 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474, 1526.
Congress believed that S Corporation “shareholders should be allowed to arrange
these separate corporate entities under parent-subsidiary arrangements as well as
brother-sister arrangements.” Id.
28. August, supra note 24, at 329; Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-4(a)(2) (as amended in
2014).
29. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3)(A) (2012).
30. Id. § 1361(b)(3)(B).
31. Id. § 1361(b)(3)(C).
32. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1361-5(a)(ii) (as amended in 2000), 1.1362-2(b) (as amended
in 2002).
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IRS.33  If the QSub election is terminated the corporation may not
elect to be a QSub or S Corporation for five years unless the Secretary
of the IRS consents to the election.34
B. Subchapter S Entities in Bankruptcy
The nature of Subchapter S entities creates certain complications in
bankruptcy proceedings.  The shareholders and the debtor company
in bankruptcy are no longer aligned in their interests.  The company
wants to hold onto its tax status in order to continue to pass the tax
liability through to the shareholders while the shareholders would pre-
fer to shift the tax liability back onto the debtor company.  Whether a
Subchapter S election is property of the debtor company’s bankruptcy
estate affects which party must pay the taxes.
1. Property of the Estate, the Automatic Stay, and
Voidable Transfers
The filing of a petition immediately creates a bankruptcy estate
under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.35  This estate contains “all legal
and equitable interests of the debtor in property” with some excep-
tions.36  The property right must be in place at the commencement of
the bankruptcy and not created later.37  The Bankruptcy Code does
not define “property” or “interests in property” but generally relies
on the state law, unless federal law is controlling.38  The Supreme
Court has recognized that the scope of “property” is construed more
generously for bankruptcy purposes than other contexts in order to
“secure for creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess.”39
In the 1978 revision to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress intended prop-
erty of the estate to include even “contingent interests and future in-
terests whether or not transferable by the debtor.”40
A bankruptcy filing also automatically stays all parties from any ac-
tion that might diminish the property of the estate.41  The automatic
stay in § 362 protects both creditors’ and debtors’ interests.  By pro-
tecting creditors from any attempts by another party to remove prop-
33. Id. § 1.1361-3(b) (as amended in 2000).
34. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(3)(D) (2012).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
36. Id. § 541(a)(1).
37. Id.; Bracewell v. Kelley (In re Bracewell), 454 F.3d 1234, 1241–42 (11th Cir.
2006) (“If an interest is not property on the date a case is filed, it is not covered.”).
38. Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993).
39. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966) (“Whether an item is classed as
‘property’ by the Fifth Amendment’s Just-Compensation Clause or for purposes of a
state taxing statute cannot decide hard cases under the Bankruptcy Act, whose own
purposes must ultimately govern.”).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 175–76 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6136.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
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erty from the estate, the stay retains the creditors’ potential
satisfaction of claims.42  The debtor is afforded protection because the
stay prohibits any collection efforts or enforcements of judgments
against the debtor.43  Willful violation of the stay can result in both
actual and punitive damages.44 Most United States Circuit Courts in-
cluding the Third Circuit, consider any act in violation of the stay to
be void ab initio, regardless of the reason for the transfer.45
The Bankruptcy Code gives additional avoidance powers to the
trustee to protect the estate from unlawful transfers.46  A transfer in-
cludes: “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, volun-
tary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with  (i) property; or (ii)
an interest in property.”47  The Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to
avoid a transfer of property from the debtor’s estate that occurs within
two years before the filing of a bankruptcy under § 548 if the transfer
was made to “hinder, delay or defraud” creditors.48  The trustee may
avoid any transfer that occurs after the commencement of the bank-
ruptcy if the transfer is made without permission from the court under
§ 549.49  An avoidable pre- or post-petition transfer may be recovered
at the trustee’s discretion.50
2. Discharge of Indebtedness Income
The discharge of debt received in bankruptcy may result in a higher
tax liability for the debtor because the discharge actually increases the
taxpayer’s wealth.  Under the IRC, “income from discharge of indebt-
edness” must be reported as gross income,51 which is “all income from
whatever source derived, unless excluded by law.”52
The IRC and Treasury Regulations provide some situations where
income from discharge of indebtedness can be excluded from gross
income.53  For example, discharge of indebtedness of the taxpayer is
not included in gross income “if the discharge occurs in a title 11
[bankruptcy] case . . . .”54  To qualify for this exclusion, the taxpayer
must be “under the jurisdiction of the court” and the discharge must
be “granted by the court or . . . pursuant to a plan approved by the
42. Id. § 362(a)(2)–(5) (stay as applied to the property of the estate).
43. Id. § 362(a)(1)–(2), (6)–(8) (stay as applied to the debtor).
44. Id. § 362(k)(1).
45. Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1206–07 (3d Cir. 1991).
46. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1), 549(a) (2012).
47. Id. § 101(54) (stating that transfers also include the creation of a lien, the re-
tention of title as a security interest, and the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of
redemption).
48. Id. § 548(a)(1)(A).
49. Id. § 549(a).
50. Id. § 550(a).
51. I.R.C. 61(a)(12) (2012).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (1960).
53. I.R.C. § 108; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b) (as amended in 1997).
54. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(A).
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court.”55  The taxpayer must pay a price for this exclusion of income.56
A number of the taxpayer’s tax attributes that could be used to offset
future income, including net operating losses and other carryovers,
must be decreased by the amount of the excluded income.57
3. The Modern Trend of Including Subchapter S Elections in the
Property of the Estate
Until recently, courts have held that a trustee can avoid the revoca-
tion of S Corporation tax status whether the revocation was pre-peti-
tion or post-petition because the election was property of the S
Corporation’s bankruptcy estate.58  These rulings allowed the debtor
companies to retain their tax elections and continue to pass the tax
liability through to the shareholders.
In In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., the shareholders revoked a com-
pany’s S Corporation status two weeks before the company filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy.59  The revocation would have shifted the capi-
tal gains associated with the liquidation of the company from the
shareholders to the debtor company thereby decreasing the property
available to creditors.60  The trustee—complaining that this was a
fraudulent transfer intended “to hinder, delay and defraud the credi-
tors”—sought to avoid the transfer, arguing that an election to be an S
Corporation was a “valuable property right.”61  The IRS argued that
the tax status was not a property interest because it had no present
value.62  The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that a quantifiable present value is not a requirement
for the existence of an interest in property.63  The pre-petition revoca-
tion was an avoidable transfer of property of the estate under
§ 548(a).64
An S Corporation’s revocation of its tax status after the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy was void for violating the stay and voidable as
a post-petition transfer in In re Walterman Implement Inc.65
55. Id. § 108(d)(2).
56. GRANT W. NEWTON & ROBERT LIQUERMAN, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY
TAXATION 81 (4th ed. 2012).
57. I.R.C. § 108(b) (2012).
58. Thomas E. Taylor & Douglas W. Charnas, Can a Bankruptcy Trustee Avoid an
Election to be Treated as a Corporation?, 117 J. Tax’n 77, 91–97 (2012); Parker v.
Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (re-
jecting a pre-petition revocation); Hanrahan v. Walterman (In re Walterman Imple-
ment, Inc.), Bankr. No. 05-07284, 2006 WL 1562401 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006)
(rejecting a post-petition revocation).
59. In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 229.
60. Id. at 229.
61. Id. at 229–30.
62. Id. at 232.
63. Id. at 232–33.
64. Id. at 236.
65. Hanrahan v. Walterman (In re Walterman Implement, Inc.), Bankr. No.
05–07284, 2006 WL 1562401, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa May 22, 2006).
2014] A MAJESTIC VACATION 307
Walterman, the president and major shareholder of Walterman Imple-
ment, Inc., revoked the company’s S Corporation election a few weeks
after the creditors filed an involuntary petition for bankruptcy.66  In a
motion for summary judgment, the trustee contended that the revoca-
tion violated the automatic stay and was voidable as a post-petition
transfer.67  Walterman argued that the trustee lacked standing to re-
scind the revocation because if  “the corporation can not rescind the
revocation without shareholder consent, neither can the Trustee.”68
Relying on dicta from its bankruptcy appellate panel, the bankruptcy
court recognized a debtor corporation’s property interest in its Sub-
chapter S election and granted the trustee’s motion.69
4. The Seminal Case: In re Trans–Lines West, Inc.
Both Bakersfield Westar and Walterman Implement rely on the sem-
inal decision in In re Trans–Lines West, Inc. where a Tennessee bank-
ruptcy court first decided that an S Corporation election was property
of the debtor company’s estate.70  The debtor’s sole shareholder
elected to revoke the S Corporation election a month before filing for
bankruptcy under Chapter 11.71  The trustee initiated an adversary
proceeding arguing that the revocation was voidable as a fraudulent
transfer under § 548.72
Noting that “property is nothing more than a collection of rights,”
the court reasoned that tax status is property because, under federal
law, an S Corporation has the “right to use, enjoy, and dispose of that
status.”73  The right to use and enjoy the tax status is guaranteed and
protected by I.R.C. § 1362(c), and the right to dispose of the tax status
is guaranteed and protected by I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1)(A).74
The court then stated that the tax status revocation was a transfer of
property by comparing the revocation to an election to carry forward
net operating losses (“NOLs”).75  An NOL is “the excess of the de-
ductions allowed . . . over gross income” in a particular year.76  These
losses may be deducted from the taxpayer’s income in other taxable
66. Id. at *1.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *1, *3.
69. Id. at *3–4 (relying on Halverson v. Funaro (In re Frank Funaro, Inc.), 263
B.R. 892, 898 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001)).
70. Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 233 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1998); In re Walterman Implement Inc., Bankr. No. 05–07284, 2006 WL
1562401, at *3; Guinn v. Lines (In re Trans–Lines West, Inc.), 203 B.R. 653, 662
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996).
71. In re Trans–Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 656.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 661–62.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 662.
76. I.R.C. § 172(c) (2012).
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years resulting in a lower tax liability.77  NOLs can be carried back up
to two years to be deducted against past income to generate tax re-
funds or carried forward up to twenty years to offset future income.78
Once made, elections to carry back or carry forward an NOL are
irrevocable.79
In determining whether a transfer occurred, the court relied on the
analysis of NOLs in In re Russell.80  In Russell, the debtor made elec-
tions before and after filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 to carry
forward NOLs.81  This prevented the trustee from carrying back the
NOLs and applying them to previous years’ income in order for the
estate to receive a tax refund.82  The Russell court held that NOLs
were property of the estate and that an election to carry forward the
NOLs was a transfer because it took away the estate’s right to carry
back the NOLs.83  Even though the NOL carry-forward elections were
irrevocable, the trustee could avoid the elections.84  Since this effect of
NOLs on a taxpayer’s liability is similar to the effect of revoking the
Subchapter S election and because the carry-forward of the NOL was
considered a transfer, the Trans–Lines court concluded that the revo-
cation of the S Corporation’s tax status was also a transfer.85
III. THE MAJESTIC VACATION
The general consensus regarding the inclusion of a Subchapter S
entity’s tax status in the bankruptcy estate has recently been chal-
lenged by In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC.86  The Bankruptcy Appel-
late Panel of the Ninth Circuit and bankruptcy courts in the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits have all held that an S Corporation tax election is
property of the corporation’s bankruptcy estate, but no court had ad-
dressed the tax election of a qualified Subchapter S subsidiary until
Majestic Star.87  In this case of first impression, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals vacated the lower bankruptcy court’s ruling and held that
77. Id. § 172(a).
78. Id. § 172(b)(1)(A).
79. Id. § 172(b)(3).
80. In re Trans–Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 662; see Gibson v. United States (In
re Russell), 927 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1991).
81. In re Russell, 927 F.2d at 414–15.
82. Id. at 415.
83. Id. at 417–18.
84. Id. at 417.  The case was remanded to determine if the post-petition transfer
was in ordinary course of business and if the pre-petition transfer was made with
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.  Id. at 418–19.
85. In re Trans–Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 663.
86. Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino,
LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 741–42 (3d Cir. 2013).
87. Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 234 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1998); In re Trans–Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 662; Hanrahan v. Walterman
(In re Walterman Implement, Inc.), Bankr. No. 05–07284, 2006 WL 1562401, at *3
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa May 22, 2006); In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at
759–60.
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the tax status of a QSub entity was not property of the bankruptcy
estate.88  In reaching this conclusion, the court also held that S Corpo-
ration tax status was not a property right.89  This ruling was significant
because it allowed the owner of a debtor company to shift the tax
liability that would normally pass through to the owner back onto the
debtor company, decreasing the amount of property available to
creditors.
A. The Bankruptcy of Majestic Star Casino, LLC
Majestic Star Casino, LLC was a holding company for Majestic Star
Hotels and Casinos that operated in Indiana, Colorado, Mississippi,
and Nevada and was formerly owned by Detroit businessman, Don
Barden.90  In November 2009, the holding company along with some
affiliates and subsidiaries (“Debtors”) filed a voluntary petition for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy citing increased competition, the recession,
and a recent smoking ban.91  One of the Debtors, Majestic Star Casino
II, Inc. (“MSC II”), was a qualified subsidiary of Barden Develop-
ment Inc. (“BDI”), an S Corporation, of which Don Barden was the
sole shareholder.92  As a QSub, MSC II did not exist for tax purposes,
but all its assets and liabilities and any profits or losses belonged to its
parent company, BDI.  However, BDI’s profits and losses passed
through directly to Barden due to BDI’s S Corporation status.  There-
fore, Barden, through BDI, owned and controlled MSC II and was
liable for any taxes related to MSC II’s income.
After filing for bankruptcy both BDI and MSC II initially retained
their tax elections. However, the automatic stay would have prevented
Barden from using any assets of MSC II to pay taxes related to MSC
II’s income.93  In an attempt to avoid this tax liability and without
permission from the bankruptcy court, Barden successfully petitioned
the IRS to revoke the S Corporation status of BDI.94  The revocation
of the S Corporation status prevented BDI’s profits and losses from
passing through to Barden.  MSC II’s QSub status disappeared be-
cause it was dependent on BDI existing as an S Corporation.  There-
88. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 758–59, 763–64.
89. Id. at 758.
90. Nick Bunkley, Don Barden, 67, a Success in Cable TV and Casinos, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2011, at B12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/business/
20barden.html; In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 742.
91. Competition Factor in Majestic Star Bankruptcy, CASINO CITY TIMES (Sept. 21,
2010), http://www.casinocitytimes.com/news/article/competition-factor-in-majestic-
star-bankruptcy-195054.
92. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 742.  MSC II was a subsidiary of
BDI through two other wholly owned intermediate subsidiaries. Thus, MSC II was
owned by The Majestic Star Casino, LLC, which was owned by Majestic Holdco,
LLC, which was owned by BDI. Id. at 742 n.5.
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012).
94. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 743–44.
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fore, BDI and MSC II became separate C Corporations responsible
for their own taxes effective January 2010.95
MSC II was not able to properly plan for this tax liability because it
did not find out about this change until mid July 2010.96  The company
also had to pay a state income tax of $2.26 million to the Indiana De-
partment of Revenue, which would not have occurred under its for-
mer tax status.97
In December 2010, the Debtors filed an adversary complaint argu-
ing that MSC II’s QSub status was property of the bankruptcy estate
and that the revocation of BDI’s S Corporation status was a post-peti-
tion transfer of estate property. The Debtors claimed that this post-
election transfer was void for violating the automatic stay under § 362
and was voidable and recoverable under §§ 549-550 by the Debtors.98
The Debtors requested an order to the IRS and the State of Indiana
to reinstate BDI’s S Corporation status and MSC II’s QSub status.99
The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Debtors and granted the
order.100
B. Appeal to the Third Circuit
On appeal, the Third Circuit struck out into new territory by vacat-
ing the lower court’s ruling that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdic-
tion over the matter.101  The Debtors did not have standing to bring
the case because the QSub tax status was not property of the bank-
ruptcy estate.102
The Third Circuit was troubled by a number of inequities resulting
from the lower court’s decision: (1) Barden would have owed taxes on
income he did not receive;103 (2) the IRS would not have received a
priority payment as an administrative expense;104 (3) Barden’s rights
as a shareholder and BDI’s rights as a parent company would have
been severely restricted;105 and (4) neither BDI nor Barden would
have been able to take advantage of the exception for income from
discharge of debt while MSC II benefited from the discharge.106
The court noted three elements that must be found to determine
whether a revocation of a Subchapter S tax election was void or avoid-
able: (1) Is the tax election property?; (2) If it is property, is this prop-
95. Id. at 744.
96. Id.
97. Id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3-2-2.8(2) (West 2013).
98. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 745.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 763–64.
102. Id. at 763.
103. Id. at 746.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 760.
106. Id. at 745–46.
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erty part of the bankruptcy estate?; and (3) Is the revocation an
avoidable transfer of property?107  The Majestic Star court reasoned
that both S Corporation and QSub elections are not property and,
even if they were, this property would not be part of the bankruptcy
estate because an S Corporation election would belong to the share-
holders, and a QSub election would belong to its parent S Corpora-
tion.108  The court did not consider the third element because the first
two were not satisfied.109
IV. SUBCHAPTER S TAX ELECTIONS SHOULD BE
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
Despite this recent anomaly in Majestic Star, the modern trend to
include S Corporation tax elections in the property of the estate prop-
erly applies the relevant law and should also extend to QSubs. The
arguments set forth by the Majestic Star court do not reflect most
courts’ generous construal of property rights for bankruptcy purposes.
This Section will examine these tax elections to demonstrate that they
exhibit the nature of property interests and belong to the debtor
company.
A. A Better Comparison: In re Dittmar
The Third Circuit stated that “[t]he Trans-Lines West decision and
those that follow it base their conclusion that S-Corp status is property
on a series of precedents holding net operating losses . . . to be prop-
erty.”110  The court limited its analysis of the property nature of Sub-
chapter S election by requiring these elections to reflect the nature of
NOLs.111
However, neither Trans-Lines nor Bakersfield Westar compares S
Corporation elections to NOLs to determine whether the tax elections
were “property.”  Rather, having already established that the elec-
tions were property, the courts have used the comparisons to argue
that the revocation of an S Corporation tax election was a “transfer of
property” just like carrying forward a NOL was a transfer of prop-
erty.112 Trans-Lines used the comparison to argue that even though
the carry-back or -forward of an NOL and the revocation of an S Cor-
poration election were irrevocable under the IRC, they were still
transfers because both resulted in an increase in tax liability of the
107. Id. at 750; 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2012).
108. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 758–59, 762.
109. Id. at 750.
110. Id. at 753 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 754–56.
112. Guinn v. Lines (In re Trans–Lines W., Inc.), 203 B.R. 653, 662–63 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1996); Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 234–36
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
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companies.113  Therefore, the Third Circuit in Majestic Star did not
fully and adequately address the nature of property rights regarding S
Corporation elections, but incorrectly assumed that the S Corporation
election must be of the same nature as NOLs to be property. Even
though a comparison between NOLs and Subchapter S tax elections is
not necessary to determine the property nature of the tax elections,
this comparison will still be analyzed to demonstrate other weaknesses
in the Majestic Star court’s arguments.
A better application of the broad construal of property rights in
bankruptcy context can be found in In re Dittmar, where the Tenth
Circuit held that stock appreciation rights (“SARs”) created by a col-
lective bargaining agreement were property of the bankruptcy es-
tate.114  Similar to stock options, SARs are a form of employee
compensation in which employees are rewarded based on the future
growth of the company.115  The company gives the employees SARs
and promises that once the company meets certain goals spelled out in
the SAR plan, it will pay the employees a cash bonus or stock based
on the appreciation of the company’s value.116  These rights in Dittmar
show a comparable degree of contingency, indeterminable valuation,
lack of debtor control and transferability to S Corporation and QSub
tax elections.
B. Contingency and Valuation of Subchapter S Elections
The Third Circuit focused on the contingency and valuation of S
Corporation elections by comparing them to NOLs to argue that they
are not property.  Extending the property interest of NOLs to S Cor-
poration status as in Trans-Lines “fail[s] to consider important differ-
ences between the two putative property interests.”117  An NOL is
different from an S Corporation election because the tax status is “en-
tirely contingent on the will of the shareholders” while NOLs are
“hardly contingent at all.”118 An NOL also has a determinable value
while the value of an S Corporation election is “dependent on its not
being revoked, as well as the amount and timing of future
earnings.”119
The Supreme Court has held that an interest is not outside the
scope of property simply because “it is novel or contingent or because
enjoyment must be postponed.”120  The Third Circuit has even held
113. In re Trans–Lines W., Inc., 203 B.R. at 663.
114. Parks v. Dittmar (In re Dittmar), 618 F.3d 1199, 1209–10 (10th Cir. 2010).
115. See Stuart R. Cohn, Stock Appreciation Rights and the SEC: A Case of Ques-
tionable Rulemaking, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 70–73 (1979).
116. See id.; In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1204.
117. Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino,
LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 755 (3d Cir. 2013).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 755–56.
120. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
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that the “mere ‘opportunity’ to receive an economic benefit in the
future” is property of the estate.121  The court’s ruling in Majestic Star
does not reflect this principle it claims to hold.  The court argues that
an S Corporation election is not property because it is entirely contin-
gent on the will of the shareholders while a carried-back NOL is
“hardly contingent at all.”122  Here, the court makes an error in its
comparison—the contingency of the NOL is whether the company
will benefit from it, which the court notes is very likely.  The court
should have compared this to the likelihood of benefitting from the
tax election.  The contingency of whether the S Corporation status will
continue or be revoked is simply a factor of this benefit, not the con-
tingency that should be directly compared to NOLs.  In fact, the likeli-
hood that an S Corporation will benefit from its tax status is very high,
even if it might possibly be taken away in a revocation.  A pass-
through election benefits the company every time it should pay a cor-
porate tax because its income is not subject to double taxation at the
federal and, in most cases, state levels.123
A Subchapter S election is no more contingent or indeterminable in
value than a SAR.  The value of a SAR is dependent on the “amount
and timing of future earnings” just as is the value of a Subchapter S
election.124 Even though the potential for gain exists, there is no guar-
antee that the company will succeed in meeting these goals, so the
employees could possibly never benefit from their SARs. Payment of
the SARs in Dittmar was dependent on whether the “company com-
pleted an IPO, sale or merger.”125 The right was also contingent on
the continued employment of the employee, which is not entirely
under the employee’s control.126 Just as an S Corporation election is
terminable “at will” by the shareholders,127 a SAR is terminable if the
employer fires or lays off the employee. Despite these contingencies,
the Dittmar court held that SARs are property by reasoning that the
suggestion “that a contingent interest cannot become property of the
bankruptcy estate unless the contingency is entirely in control of the
interest holder . . . amounts to nothing more than a statement that
121. Pension Transfer Corp. v. Beneficiaries Under the Third Amendment to Frue-
hauf Trailer Corp. Ret. Plan No. 003 (In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp.), 444 F.3d 203, 211
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
of R.M.L., Inc. (In re R.M.L., Inc.), 92 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1996)).
122. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 755.
123. I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2012); James A. Amdur, Annotation, State Income Tax
Treatment of S Corporations and Their Shareholders, 118 A.L.R. 5th 597, 618 § 2[a]
(2004).
124. Cohn, supra note 115, at 70–71; In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at
756.
125. In re Lowe, 380 B.R. 251, 254 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007), aff’d on other grounds,
Parks v. Dittmar (In re Dittmar), 410 B.R. 71 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 618 F.3d
1199 (10th Cir. 2010).
126. In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1208.
127. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 756.
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virtually no contingent interest can be property of the bankruptcy
estate.”128
C. Control, Alienability, and Assignability of
Subchapter S Elections
The Majestic Star court noted three other characteristics of S Cor-
poration elections and QSub elections that attempt to further exclude
these elections outside the scope of property. An S Corporation has
little control over its tax status, but a QSub has even less control; it is
dependent upon both the S Corporation’s decision to keep the elec-
tion and continuance of its S Corporation status.129  S Corporation
and QSub status are also not property rights because they are not
“readily alienable and assignable” and therefore could not be sold to
produce funds for creditors of the estate.130  The court concluded that
a “tax classification [such as a Qsub] over which the debtor has no
control and that is not alienable or assignable” is not a property inter-
est of the debtor.131
Majestic Star’s strongest argument is in regards to the debtor com-
pany’s control of its QSub tax election.  An S Corporation is not fully
out of the control of its election.  Just as the beneficiaries of the SARs
in Dittmar could only dispose of the property once the company met
specified goals,132 an S Corporation can only dispose of its election at
any time by submitting a revocation letter to the IRS with consent
from a majority of shareholders.133  But a QSub has even less control
than an S Corporation over its tax status, as it can only be created or
revoked by the parent S Corporation or through actions of the S Cor-
poration shareholders.134 The election to be a QSub must be made by
an officer of the parent S Corporation.135  Nevertheless, this should
not be determinative of whether it is an interest in property but is
merely one factor to be considered.136
128. In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1208.
129. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 758.
130. Id. at 756 n.21, 758.
131. Id. at 758.
132. See supra text accompanying note 124.
133. Treas. Reg. § 1.1362-6(a)(3)(i) (as amended in 2002).
134. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 758.
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-3(b) (as amended in 2000); see I.R.S. Form 8869 Qualified
Subchapter S Subsidiary Election (Rev. Dec. 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/f8869.pdf.
136. The First Circuit reasoned that “transferability, pecuniary value, control, en-
joyment—should be treated as among the relevant considerations in a highly fact-
specific inquiry” when discussing factors considered in Drye v. United States, 528 U.S.
49 (1999) to assess the nature of property for tax liens.  United States v. Murray, 217
F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2000).  The determination of property for bankruptcy purposes
should be at least as broad, if not broader, than the determination of property for tax
purposes.
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The final factors addressed by the Majestic Star court are alienabil-
ity and assignability of S Corporation and QSub statuses. Subchapter
S elections by nature are not transferable or assignable by the debtor
or by the trustee to raise funds for the estate.137  The Third Circuit
argued that a right should not be property of the estate if it is “dubi-
ous, as a practical matter, that any potential buyers would actually bid
for the right.”138  SARs are also not generally transferable or assigna-
ble by the owner,139 and it is unlikely that the trustee of a debtor em-
ployee would be able to find any potential buyers because payment of
the SAR is contingent on both the growth of the employer’s business
and the continued employment of the employee.140  Just as SARs in
Dittmar brought value to the estate even though the trustee would not
have been able to sell them, the inalienable and unassignable QSub
status of MSC II brought value to its bankruptcy estate.  The Third
Circuit should not restrict its definition of property of the estate in this
way when an interest still brings value to the estate even though no
one would purchase it.
D. Subchapter S Elections are Property of the
Debtor Company’s Estate
While a Subchapter S election may not be fully-owned property of
the debtor company, it is a property interest of the company because
it creates an economic benefit to the company by preventing taxation
at the corporate level, thereby providing funds to creditors in
bankruptcy.
Even if the tax status of a QSub were property, the court argued
that this property would not be part of the bankruptcy estate because
it would be property of the parent S Corporation.141 Looking at the
relationship between shareholders and S Corporations, the court
noted that the “flow-through” treatment of S Corporations indicates
that any ownership rights would be held by the shareholders.142 An S
Corporation “retains no real benefit from its tax-free status in that,
while there is no entity-level tax, all of its pre-tax income is passed on
to its shareholders.”143 Similarly, since a QSub is a disregarded entity
that does not exist for tax purposes but is deemed to be part of the
parent S Corporation, it would be the S Corporation that has any
ownership right.144
137. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 756 n.21, 758.
138. Id. at 758 (citing Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d
233, 250 (3d Cir. 2001)).
139. Cohn, supra note 115, at 70.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 124–25; Robert Anderson IV, Employee
Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1211 (2003).
141. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 759–60.
142. Id. at 759.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 759–60.
316 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
As noted above, Congress created Subchapter S in order to benefit
both individual shareholders and small corporations.145  The Majestic
Star court was inaccurate and misleading to say that a pass-through
corporation “retains no real benefit” of its tax election while down-
playing the benefit of no corporate tax at the entity level.146 The court
also incorrectly presented the question of who has a right to this QSub
election as an either/or option; either it is property of the QSub or
property of the S Corporation. Yet the ruling of the lower bankruptcy
court was that MSC II had a “property interest in its QSub status.”147
This does not mean that the parent S Corporation or the shareholders
cannot also have a property interest in it.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND INEQUITIES
The Majestic Star court did not rely solely on statutory and case
analysis in forming its decision, but expressed concern about a number
of implications and inequities caused by the lower court’s ruling.148
Some of these concerns are legitimate, but others are not as significant
as the court presents and could have been remedied another way.  The
court’s decision refused to alleviate inequities towards MSC II and its
creditors.  The Majestic Star court failed to demonstrate that the al-
leged inequities resulting from the bankruptcy court’s order out-
weighed the inequities allowed by the Third Circuit.
A. Tax Liability with No Access to Income and
Administrative Expenses
While in bankruptcy, the tax liability for MSC II passed through to
BDI and Barden, who had no access to the company’s income to pay
the taxes.  The court emphasized this inequity since taxes are usually
“paid by those who derive some benefit from income.”149  The IRS
generally recovers taxes from the property of the estate as administra-
tive expenses before most other claims.150  But if the pass-through tax
status had remained in place, the court noted that the IRS would have
lost its priority position and would have had to look for payment from
Barden, who had no access to the income of the company.151
145. See supra Section II.A.
146. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 759.  The Debtors argued that
MSC II was actually not benefitting Barden at all, which is why he elected for the
company to enter bankruptcy.  Brief for Debtors-Appellees at 36–37 In re Majestic
Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3200, 12-3201), 2012 WL
6813041 at *36–37.
147. Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino,
LLC), 466 B.R. 666, 676 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012), vacated, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013).
148. See supra Section III.B.
149. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 757.
150. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(1)(B), 507(a)(2) (2012).
151. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 746.
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The court is right to consider this concern, yet the Debtors noted in
their appellate brief that even the IRS has presented conflicting opin-
ions regarding the tax liability of pass-through entities in bank-
ruptcy.152  In In re Harbor Village Development, the IRS actually
defended the position that the tax liability of a partnership in bank-
ruptcy should pass through to the partners, even though the partners
could not access funds in the partnership to pay the taxes.153  Yet the
IRS, in its brief for Majestic Star, emphasized the inequitable results
for Barden due to maintaining BDI’s S Corporation status.154  The
Majestic Star court should not have decided whether Subchapter S
elections were property of the estate based on this inequitable out-
come, especially relying on the inconsistent opinion of the IRS.
Furthermore, considering this tax election to be a property interest
of the estate does not necessarily result in this complication.  Even if
the tax election was included in the bankruptcy estate, the judge of the
bankruptcy court still had authority to allow the revocation if Barden
had requested it.155 By ruling that the tax election is not property of
the estate, the Third Circuit has completely removed the judge’s dis-
cretion to determine whether the revocation should occur.
Based on the prior case law, Barden should have known that he
might have to pay taxes for the company if it entered bankruptcy.
This can be illustrated by another instance where a taxpayer does not
have access to income from a pass-through company.  For example,
even though a pass-through entity may receive income resulting in a
tax liability, it does not necessarily distribute funds to the owners to
cover the liability.156  Except when there is a shareholder or partner-
ship agreement in place to require this distribution, shareholders and
partners should expect that a distribution might not occur and that
they would need to arrange to pay the liability from other funds.157
Likewise, Barden should have been aware enough of the tax implica-
tions for Subchapter S entities enough to prepare for the likely tax
liability without access to the company’s income.  In fact, the Debtors
also argued that Barden was fully aware of the potential for tax liabil-
ity in bankruptcy because MSC II had entered into a secured agree-
152. Brief for Debtors-Appellees, supra note 146, at 34.
153. Id. at 34–35 (citing In re Harbor Vill. Dev., 94-1188-JNF, 1994 WL 774514
(Bankr. D. Mass. Nov. 28, 1994)).
154. Brief for Appellant United States of America, at 31–32 In re Majestic Star
Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3200, 12-3201), 2012 WL 5893859 at
*31–32 (“The inequities in the Trans-Lines West line of cases apply with equal force
to this case.”).
155. See Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1037 n.4
(5th Cir. 1994); Taylor & Charnas, supra note 58, at 96.
156. In this case, “MSC II was under no contractual obligation to make tax distri-
butions to Barden.”  Brief for Debtors-Appellees, supra note 146, at 3.
157. In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 162 B.R. 62, 65 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
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ment with creditors to prevent any distributions of income to Barden
in the event of default.158
B. Rights of the Shareholders Restricted
The court also argued that “rights statutorily granted to sharehold-
ers to control the tax status of the entity they own” should not be
overridden by such a “capacious” definition of property.159  Inclusion
of the QSub status in the property of the estate would place “remark-
able restrictions on rights of the parent,” preventing them from: (1)
voluntarily terminating the QSub status or its own S Corporation sta-
tus; (2) selling subsidiary shares to any purchasers other than a S Cor-
poration; or (3) selling the parent to a C Corporation, non resident, or
to more than 100 shareholders.160  Exercising any of these statutory
rights would have terminated MSC II’s QSub status, but these rights
would have been unfairly taken away had the court prevented the
revocation.
The court’s label of “statutory rights” regarding selling shares is
somewhat misleading.  The purpose of § 1361 is not to grant share-
holders a right to sell their shares but to place restrictions on whom
shares can be sold to if the company wants to retain its tax election.161
The only statutory right actually granted by the IRC and regulations is
the right to terminate the tax elections.162  This “inequity” is not very
significant because it is not likely that anyone would have bought
shares of MSC II while it was in bankruptcy, especially when the cred-
itors were taking over as equity holders.  In fact, the secured credit
agreement prevented Barden from selling any MSC II shares to any-
one other than Majestic Star LLC or its subsidiaries.163  When the
statute creating Subchapter S elections is designed to restrict the ac-
tions of shareholders,164 and when a Subchapter S entity is in the con-
text of the restrictive proceedings of bankruptcy, owners of the
company should anticipate that they might be limited in their actions.
C. The Bankruptcy Court’s Order
The Third Circuit was correct that the order of the bankruptcy court
created some complications by causing the company to emerge from
158. Brief for Debtors-Appellees, supra note 145, at 35–36.
159. Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino,
LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 757 (3d Cir. 2013).
160. Id. at 760.
161. I.R.C. § 1361 (2012).  Shareholders already have the right to sell their shares
regardless of § 1361.
162. Id. § 1362; Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-3(b) (as amended in 2000).
163. Brief for Debtors-Appellees, supra note 145, at 3.
164. August, supra note 24, at 322.  The requirement of one class of stock prevents
a “liquidation or distribution preference to any shareholder” and limits buy-sell
agreements, agreements to restrict the transferability of stock, and cross purchase and
redemption agreements. Id. at 298.
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bankruptcy as a QSub from the perspective of the IRS.  This was due
to an error in the timing and specificity of the order rather than an
incorrect judgment on the nature of tax elections as property of the
estate.
The Majestic Star court noted that if the QSub tax status continued
“even after having emerged from bankruptcy,” Barden would remain
liable even though the unsecured creditors were the new equity hold-
ers in the company.165  However, the Debtors were not trying to
emerge from bankruptcy as a QSub, but they had in fact been permit-
ted by the bankruptcy court to reform the company as an LLC in No-
vember 2011.166  When the Debtors requested the court to order the
tax elections to be reinstated in December 2010 and moved for sum-
mary judgment on the issue in March 2011, they had not yet become
an LLC.167  If the court had granted this motion at that point, the tax
elections would have been reinstated, the tax liability would have
shifted back to BDI, and then the QSub status would have been re-
voked when MSC II became an LLC.
By the time the court ruled on the Debtors’ motion for summary
judgment in January 2012, the effective date of the reorganization
plan had passed and the Debtors had already become an LLC, taking
an equity position in the company.168  The bankruptcy court’s order
simply stated that the revocation of BDI’s S Corporation status and
the termination of MSC II’s QSub status were void and of no effect
and that the IRS should restore both statuses.169  So from the perspec-
tive of the state, the company was a multi-member LLC; yet from the
perspective of the IRS, the company was a QSub.  The order should
have specifically requested that the tax elections be reinstated from
the effective date of the revocation up until the effective date of the
formation of the LLC.  This would have prevented the company from
emerging from bankruptcy as a QSub for federal tax purposes.
The Majestic Star court also pointed out that if Barden had retained
liability when the discharge occurred, then he would have been liable
for $170 million of “cancellation of debt” (COD) income while not
benefitting from the Title 11 Bankruptcy Exception.170   The Title 11
Exception allows the taxpayer to write down any COD income from a
bankruptcy, but it requires that the taxpayer be under the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy court.171  Because MSC II was an LLC when the
discharge occurred on the effective date of the plan, the income from
discharge of debt should have been applied to the new equity holders
165. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 746.
166. Id. at 744.
167. Id. at 745.
168. Id.
169. Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino,
LLC) 466 B.R. 666, 679 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012), vacated, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013).
170. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 745–46.
171. See supra Section II.B.2.
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who could have then used the Title 11 Exception.  However, the order
retroactively reinstated the tax elections without a termination date.
From the perspective of the IRS, MSC II was a QSub when the dis-
charge occurred.  Therefore, the income from discharge of indebted-
ness passed through to BDI and Barden.  Since neither BDI nor
Barden were under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, they
could not take the exception, and MSC II could avoid the tax liability
of the COD income and not suffer any of the negative consequences
of the Title 11 Exception.172
This problem was also due to the error in the order, and was not
caused by holding the QSub tax election to be property of the estate.
The judge did not approve a plan that would intentionally allow the
new equity holders to keep the QSub status after bankruptcy, but the
timing and lack of clarity in the order created the complication. If the
reinstatement of the QSub status had only been effective until the
date of the LLC formation, then the new equity holders would have
been able to take the Title 11 Exception along with the tax attribute
reductions that come with it.  The Third Circuit could have remanded
the case back to the bankruptcy court to fix the error in the court’s
order to avoid these complications rather than vacating the judgment.
D. Inequities Allowed by the Majestic Star Decision
The Majestic Star decision also permitted other inequities.  The
Third Circuit acknowledged MSC II’s concern that the revocation
would create tax difficulties for the company,173 but failed to recog-
nize that these inequities outweighed the other issues on which the
court focused.  Since Barden revoked the S Corporation status of BDI
without the bankruptcy court’s approval, MSC II was unaware of the
revocation until more than six months after the revocation was effec-
tive.174  The company was not able to plan for $2.26 million in taxes
owed to the State of Indiana or the federal income taxes that would be
due for 2010.175  The State of Indiana was unjustly enriched by receiv-
ing property of the bankruptcy estate that should not belong to it.176
The lack of notice also led MSC II to file incorrect and late quarterly
financial statements.177  MSC II incurred late penalties and interest
because the tax payments were not made.178  MSC II had no reason to
expect this unforeseen tax liability based on the fifteen years of bank-
172. In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 746.
173. Id. at 744.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Debtors’ Adversary Complaint, at 7 In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 466 B.R.
666 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (No. 09bk14136), 2010 WL 6560660.
177. Id. at 6.
178. Id. at 7.
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ruptcy law that had included Subchapter S elections in the property of
the bankruptcy estate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit surprisingly took a break from the modern trend
regarding the property nature of Subchapter S elections in bank-
ruptcy. It remains to be seen whether the IRS will convince other cir-
cuits to follow the Majestic vacation. The protection of creditors of
Subchapter S entities in bankruptcy is no longer clear.
Subchapter S elections should be property of a bankruptcy estate
because they provide a debtor company with an economic benefit that
can be used to satisfy the claims of creditors. The Third Circuit erro-
neously restricted its analysis of the property nature of these elections
and did not adequately assess the resulting inequities. The court
should have applied a generous construal of property rights to MSC
II’s QSub status, just as the Tenth Circuit did to SARs in Dittmar.
Including these tax elections in a debtor company’s bankruptcy estate
properly interprets the law, protects creditors, and provides more dis-
cretion to bankruptcy courts to determine an equitable result.
